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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Hasan lcanovic appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction
relief after an evidentiary hearing.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In the underlying criminal case lcanovic pied guilty to felony domestic
violence pursuant to a plea agreement with the state.

(Order Re: Evidentiary

Hearing Held June 21, 2013, p. 2 (hereinafter "Order").)

lcanovic initiated the

instant case by filing a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 3-5.) lcanovic
alleged that defense counsel had assured him that his guilty plea would not result
in his deportation to Bosnia nor result in loss of the ability to apply for United
States citizenship. (R., pp. 4, 7-8.) lcanovic was a legal permanent resident of
the United States at the time. (Supp. Tr., p. 80, Ls. 16-19.)
After an evidentiary hearing 1 the district court found that lcanovic's
counsel told lcanovic "that if he chose to plead guilty, it was possible he could be
deported and that there could be adverse impacts on his ability to obtain United

The district court initially granted the state's motion for summary dismissal,
which the state on appeal conceded was error because there remained material
issues of fact. (Uncontested Motion for Remand and Statement in Support
Thereof.) lcanovic's attempt to turn this concession of material issues of fact,
made in the context of summary dismissal proceedings, into factual or legal
concessions on remand (Petitioner's Memorandum in re: Padilla v. Kentucky and
Laffler v. Cooper, p. 4 (augmentation) (claiming motion constituted a stipulation
to deficient performance); Appellant's brief, p. 17 (state "acknowledged" that only
issue regarding deficient performance was statutory comparison)), is highly
inappropriate.
The state conceded neither deficient performance nor the
irrelevance of law guiding the actual deportation proceeding.
1

1

States citizenship." (Order, p. 27.) Furthermore, "during the course of the taking
of the guilty plea, [the district court] advised Mr. lcanovic that a felony or even a
misdemeanor conviction could result in his deportation, inability to obtain legal
status or denial of an application for United States citizenship.

Mr. lcanovic

stated under oath that he understood these potential consequences of pleading
guilty." (Id. (footnote omitted).) These representations were "legally correct" and
"factually accurate in light of the relevant statutes, rules, and ICE practices and
procedures."

(Id. at pp. 27-29.) The court therefore found there was neither

deficient performance of counsel (Order, pp. 26-30) nor prejudice (Order, pp. 3133).

2

ISSUE
lcanovic states the issues on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. lcanovic's petition
for post-conviction relief?
(Appellant's brief, p. 10.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has lcanovic failed to demonstrate either legal or factual error in the
district court's order denying his petition for post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
lcanovic Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The District Court's Order Denying
His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief

A

Introduction
lcanovic alleged that his counsel informed him that his guilty plea to felony

domestic violence would not result in his deportation or losing his ability to apply
for citizenship, and that but for this advice he would not have pied guilty. (R., pp.
4, 8.) The district court found lcanovic's evidence not credible, the testimony of
counsel credible, and that lcanovic had in fact been advised both by counsel and
by the district court that his guilty plea might have immigration consequences.
(Order, pp. 12, 27.)

lcanovic argues that even though he failed to prove his

allegations he was still entitled to relief, because informing him that he might be
deported was still ineffective assistance of counsel.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 13-

25.) lcanovic's argument that the district court should have granted him relief on
the unpled theory that counsel had informed him that his guilty plea might result
in his deportation is without merit because counsel's statements were neither
incorrect nor prejudicial. 2

The state initially argued that Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), should
not be given retroactive effect. (Brief of respondent, pp. 9-21.) Indeed, the
Supreme Court of the United States has held that a petitioner whose conviction
was final prior to the decision in Padilla may not invoke the holding of that case to
collaterally attack a criminal judgment. Chaidez v. United States,_ U.S. _ ,
133 S.Ct. 1103 (2013). In its motion to remand, the state conceded that Padilla
was decided the day before the judgment in this case became final.
(Uncontested Motion for Remand and Statement in Support Thereof, p. 3.)
2
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B.

Standard Of Review
Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature and therefore
the applicant's allegations must be proven by a preponderance of
the evidence. When appellate review of a district court's denial of
post-conviction relief follows an evidentiary hearing, rather than a
summary dismissal, the evidence must be viewed most favorably to
the trial court's findings. On review, this Court will not disturb the
district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
However, this Court exercises free review of the district court's
application of the relevant law to the facts. If a district court
reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, this Court will
affirm the order upon the correct theory. Additionally, constitutional
issues are pure questions of law over which this Court exercises
free review.

Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, _ , 321 P.3d 709, 713 -714 (2014) (internal
quotes and citations omitted).

C.

lcanovic Failed To Prove Either Deficient Performance Or Prejudice
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner

must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the petitioner
was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 68788 (1984); Murray, 156 Idaho at_, 321 P.3d at 714. To establish a deficiency,
the petitioner has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Murray, 156 Idaho at_, 321
P.3d at 714; Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988);
Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 442, 163 P.3d 222, 231 (Ct. App. 2007). To
establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for
the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been
different. Murray. 156 Idaho at_, 321 P.3d at 714; Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 442,
163 P.3d at 231.

Where the defendant was convicted upon a guilty plea, to
5

satisfy the prejudice element the claimant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he or she would not have pied guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985);

Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612,621,262 P.3d 255,264 (2011).
In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010), the Supreme Court of
the United States held "that counsel must inform her client whether his plea
carries a risk of deportation." "[W]hen the deportation consequence is truly clear
... the duty to give correct advice is equally clear," but "[w]hen the law is not
succinct and straightforward ... a criminal defense attorney need do no more
than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of
adverse immigration consequences."

kl

at 369.

In lcanovic's case neither the

deportation law nor the end result of that process was "succinct and
straightforward," and therefore counsel's advice that a guilty plea "may carry a
risk" of deportation was entirely accurate. (Order, pp. 26-29.) Because counsel
"inform[ed] [his] client" that "his plea carries a risk of deportation," the district
court correctly found he fulfilled his obligation of reasonableness.
lcanovic, citing Padilla, claims that counsel has a "duty to give concrete,
accurate, affirmative advice as to specific immigration consequences," which is
measured against "whether the federal statutory law makes it clear that the
particular offense will render the non-citizen client eligible for deportation or
subject to automatic deportation." (Appellant's brief, p. 16 (emphasis omitted).)
First, the Supreme Court required no such duty of "concrete, accurate, affirmative
advice," but only that "his plea carries a risk of deportation." Padilla, 559 U.S. at

6

374. Moreover, reading Padilla as holding that a defendant is more interested in
testing counsel's statutory knowledge than in knowing whether he will actually be
deported is both unwarranted and strains common sense.

Finally, lcanovic's

laser-like focus on what made him eligible for deportation simply ignores most of
the applicable deportation law and procedure.
ICE Officer Brandon Jones testified that after "the individual is found
removable" by an immigration judge, his "legal permanent residence [sic] status
is revoked and [he is] kept in ICE custody and we begin trying to obtain travel
documents for that individual" from the country of origin. (Supp. Tr., p. 73, Ls.
20-25.) ICE custody can last only up to 180 days. (Supp. Tr., p. 74, Ls. 1-15.) If
the travel documents are not issued by the country of origin ICE is legally
"required to release that individual on [his] own recognizance." (Supp. Tr., p. 74,
Ls. 4-22; see also Supp. Tr., p. 76, Ls. 1-16 (can hold beyond 180 days only if
immediate removal "highly likely").) If the individual is from a country from which
ICE cannot obtain travel documents he "would never in effect be removed from
the United States." (Supp. Tr., p. 84, Ls. 16 - p. 85, L. 14.) Bosnia, lcanovic's
country of origin, is "tricky" because "verifying citizenship in Bosnia is quite a
lengthy process." (Supp. Tr., p. 85, L. 15 - p. 86, L. 5.)
lcanovic's argument assumes that the only relevant step in this process is
the immigration judge's determination that the individual is removable, and that
the legal ability to actually remove the individual is irrelevant. This reads Padilla
too narrowly, and would lead to the absurd result that where the defendant is
deemed removable by the judge but never actually removed, the attorney who

7

inaccurately advised a client he would be deported would be deemed effective
while the attorney who accurately predicted the person would not be deported is
deemed ineffective. lcanovic has not demonstrated that the district court erred
by concluding lcanovic failed to prove that his trial counsel was ineffective for
advising him that deportation was a possibility (as opposed to a sure thing) if he
pied guilty.
Even if his attorney could theoretically have given better legal advice, his
advice was, as a matter of fact, spot on, and therefore there can be no prejudice.
lcanovic had the burden of showing "that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (footnote and
citations omitted). To obtain relief he has to "convince the court that a decision to
reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances."
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372 (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)).
lcanovic's only evidence of prejudice was his assertion that "[b]ut for
[defense counsel's] advisement, I would not have pied guilty."

(R., p. 8.)

Counsel's alleged "advisement" was that pleading guilty "would not" "result in me
being deported to Bosnia."

(Id.)

Thus, the prejudice claim was based on

underlying facts (an affirmative representation that he would not be deported)
that the district court specifically rejected. lcanovic presented no evidence that
the actual advice given by counsel, that pleading guilty might result in
deportation, played any role whatsoever in lcanovic's decision to accept the plea
agreement. Because lcanovic presented no evidence suggesting that but for the
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allegedly erroneous advice that he might be deported he would not have pied
guilty and would have gone to trial, the district court correctly found no prejudice.
Moreover, lcanovic has presented no theory by which he would have been
better off rejecting the state's plea offer and going to trial.

He was no less

subject to deportation after a guilty verdict than after a guilty plea. The district
court found that the state's charge was backed not only by the victim's testimony,
but also by physical evidence and the testimony of "an uninvolved third-party
witness." (Order, pp. 31-32.) The district court concluded that if lcanovic had
elected to go to trial it is "overwhelmingly likely that he would be in the same, or
likely a worse, position." (Order, p. 32.)
lcanovic asserts that no evidence was presented in post-conviction
regarding what evidence would have been presented at trial had he rejected the
plea offer.

(Appellant's brief, pp., 23-24.)

Even assuming the truth of this

assertion, lcanovic's claim that there is a lack of evidence ultimately cuts against
him. It was his burden of proof, and there is no evidence that lcanovic had a
better chance of avoiding deportation had he gone to trial, and therefore no
evidence that it would have been reasonable to reject the state's plea offer.
It was lcanovic's burden to prove that he would not have pied guilty and

would have insisted on going to trial but for counsel's deficient performance. On
appeal he only claims that he proved he "was very concerned about the potential
immigration consequences of his guilty plea." (Appellant's brief, p. 25.) He can
cite to no evidence, however, that going to trial would have better addressed this
concern than pleading guilty. He points out that in his affidavit he claimed he
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would not have entered the plea. (Id.) His statement that he would not have
entered the plea but for counsel's advice there would be no deportation is of
marginal relevance where the facts show the claimed advice was never given.
lcanovic failed to prove the theory he pied (that he was told there would be no
immigration consequences) and has failed on appeal to even articulate how he
was prejudiced by the facts ultimately proved (that he was informed there may be
immigration consequences). lcanovic has failed to demonstrate that he proved
any prejudice from the advice in fact given by counsel (and reiterated by the trial
court).
The district court found, based on a credibility determination, that counsel
in fact advised lcanovic that there was the possibility of deportation upon his
conviction. The district court also informed him of this possibility during the plea
colloquy.

lcanovic does not assert on appeal that the district court erred by

rejecting

his allegations of being told

there would

be

no immigration

consequences and making these factual findings. These factual findings, in turn,
show that there was neither deficient performance nor prejudice. lcanovic has
failed to show error in the district court's order denying his petition for postconviction relief.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
and judgment denying the petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this 19th day of June, 2014

KENNETH K. JORG N
Deputy Attorney Ge eral
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of June, 2014, served a true
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy
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JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE AP PELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in the State Appellate Publi Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

KKJ/pm

11

